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Abstract
This paper investigates the conventional wisdom that markets should allocate the rights for
performing decisional tasks to those players who might be best suited to perform the task.
We embed the decisional tasks in a stylised setting of a game, motivated by Littlewood (1953)
Red Hat Puzzle, where the optimal choices in the game require players to employ logical and
epistemological reasoning. We present a treatment where players are permitted to trade their
participation rights to the game. The payo↵s are furthermore calibrated such that those players
who know the optimal choices in the game should value the participation rights strictly more
than those who do not. However, aggregated performances in this treatment were found to be
significantly lower than the control treatments where players were not permitted to trade their
participation rights, providing little support for the conventional wisdom. We show that this
finding could be attributed to price “bubbles” in the markets for participations rights.
Keywords: Game Theory, Trading Markets, Experimental Economics, Red Hat Puzzle
JEL Classifications: C92, C72, G02, G12
Most societies integrate markets where economic players are able to buy and sell the “rights” for
performing decisional tasks. An early example from the 17th to 19th centuries, is the British Army’s
purchase system, where commissioned ranks and responsibilities were sold at pre-determined prices
(Bruce, 1980; Brereton, 1986). A more recent example, is the market for corporate governance,
where managers compete for the rights to manage the corporate resources of a targeted firm (Jensen
and Ruback, 1983). The conventional wisdom in the above examples is the idea that markets, when
properly structured, should allocate the rights for performing decisional tasks, to those players who
are best suited to perform the task. This paper presents an experimental design that puts the
conventional wisdom to the test.
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To do so, we embed the decisional tasks in the stylised setting of a game, motivated by Little-
wood (1953) “Red Hat Puzzle”, a well known logical reasoning problem.1 In our TRADE treatment,
markets are introduced by allowing players to trade their participation rights to the game. Here,
players who sold their participation rights are compensated by the sales revenue for avoiding the
decisional tasks in the game. Players who purchased additional rights will enter the game and their
payo↵s will depend on their behaviours in the game, multiplied by the number of rights owned.
Thus by buying over another player’s rights, one also buys over the other player’s potential payo↵s
in the game.2
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first such paper that involves a design where players
are permitted to trade their participation rights. We shall hence focus on some attractive features
of the game that are ideal for purposes of our study. As the equilibrium analysis will show, the
optimal choices in the game are (i) Pareto optimal for all players in the game (in expectations), (ii)
Non-trivial nor obvious and requires players to employ logical and epistemological reasonings, and
(iii) Independent of the number of participation rights owned or the ability to trade participation
rights.
Point (ii) is central to the research question of this paper. Since the decisional tasks in the game
requires players to employ logical and epistemological reasoning, therefore players’ sophistication
(e.g., strategic thinking abilities, cognitive reasoning abilities, problem solving skills) will be integral
to them knowing the optimal choices. This naturally partitions the population of players into the
Sophisticated types - those who have su cient sophistication to know the optimal choices in the
game - and the Unsophisticated types - those who have insu cient sophistication to ever know
the optimal choices in the game. Point (i) suggests that the expected payo↵s for participating
in the game should be strictly higher for the Sophisticated types relative to the Unsophisticated
types. When presented the opportunity to trade participation rights, it should therefore be incentive
compatible for Sophisticated types to purchase rights and Unsophisticated types to sell their rights.3
Aggregate performances in the TRADE treatment will therefore be a function of the number of
players who had adhered to the optimal choices, weighted by the participation rights owned by those
players. Finally, point (iii) suggest that aggregated performances in TRADE can be contrasted to
the control treatments where players are not permitted to trade their participation rights to the
game.
The conventional wisdom introduced at the start of this paper is for markets to allocate the
rights for performing decisional tasks, to those players who are best suited to perform the task, in
this case the Sophisticated types. We provided an environment in TRADE, where this should be
1The Red Hat Puzzle and its variations are commonly found in most graduate level game theory textbooks (e.g.,
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1993; Myerson, 1997; Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994; Maschler et al., 2013), discussions about
common knowledge (Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis, 1982; Geanakoplos, 1994) and epistemological reasonings (Fagin
et al., 1995).
2The TRADE treatment can be viewed as an asset trading market where the redemption value of the asset depends
on the behaviours of the owner in a game.
3The di↵erence in sophistications side-steps Milgrom and Stokey (1982) no-trade theorem, as both the Sophisti-
cated and Unsophisticated types can have expected gains from trade.
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possible. Therefore, if the conventional wisdoms holds, we should expect the aggregated perfor-
mances in TRADE to be significantly higher than the control treatments.
The rest of this paper is organised as followed. Section I provides an overview of the related lit-
erature, Section II presents our experimental design and discusses the equilibrium analysis, Section
III presents our test hypotheses, Section IV details our experimental procedures, Section details
our experimental results and finally, Section VI concludes.
I. Related Literature
This paper draws from two distinct areas of research. The first pertains to previous experimental
adaptions of the Red Hat Puzzle by Weber (2001) and Bayer and Chan (2007) and the second,
developments in behavioural finance.
To describe the former area of research, we shall first present an illustration of the Red Hat
Puzzle. Three girls, each wearing a coloured hat - red or black, were seated around a circle. Each
girls sees all other hats but her own - all hats are black. An observer remarks that “there is at
least one black hat” and asked the first girl if she knew the colour of her hat, to which she replied
(publicly) with “No”. The observer asked the second girl who also replied with “No”. However,
when the observer asked the third girl, she replied with “Black”. How did the third girl know her
hat colour?
To see how, first consider the case where only the first girl was wearing a black hat. Here, the
first girl would immediately reply with “Black” since she does not see any other black hats. The
second girl reasons that the first girl must have observed no other black hats, and replies with
“Red”. The same logic applies to the third girl. Now consider the case where the first and second
girls were wearing black hats. The first girl remains uncertain and replies with “No”. The second
girl reasons that the first girl must have seen another black hat and replies with “Black”. The
third girl reasons that the second girl must have only seen one other black hat (the first girl’s hat)
and replies with “Red”. Now returning to the initial illustration, the third girl observed that the
second girl had replied with “No”. She therefore reasons, that the second girl must have seen two
black hats, and deduced her own hat to be black.
Each girl in the above illustration faces the decisional task of ascertaining her own hat colour,
and she does so through a process of logical and epistemological reasoning. Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis (1982) described such a process as one of indirect communication, where each girl
through their replies, communicate some information about their posteriors with regards to the
true state of nature. Notice that the task for each girl becomes more complex and challenging as
the number of black hats observed increases. For these reasons, players’ sophistications are integral
in them resolving their hats’ colour.
Given these features, Weber (2001, experiment 2) and Bayer and Chan (2007) used the Red Hat
Puzzle (neutral framing) to study level-k (Nagel, 1995; Stahl and Wilson, 1994, 1995; Costa-Gomes
et al., 2001) reasoning behaviours. To do so, they converted the problem into a multi-period
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simultaneous choice game involving n = 2, 3 coloured hats. Players began the game observing
b 2 {0, 1, .., n   1} black hats and could only choose from the actions “No” or “Black” at each
period t = 1, 2, .., n + 1. The game ends for all players at any period whereby a player chooses
“Black”. The optimal choices - we will detail this in the later sections - in the game are for players to
choose “No” at all periods t < b+1 and “Black” at period t = b+1. Weber’s research focused on the
aggregated rate of adherence to the optimal choices.4 In his n = 3 hat treatment, at instances where
subjects where subjects observed b = 0 black hats, the adherence rate was unity. However, the
adherence rates were observed to fall significantly as b increases.5,6 Although subjects’ behaviours
in this paper may involve elements of level-k reasoning, we will omit such discussions as they divert
attention from the main area of interest. Nevertheless, Weber’s experiments point to heterogeneity
in subjects’ sophistications with respect to their behaviours in the Red Hat Puzzle. Assuming
that the population of subjects can be partitioned into Sophisticated types and Unsophisticated
types, the interest in this paper is whether markets would result in the participation rights being
purchased by the Sophisticated types.
In a separate area of research, Kluger and Wyatts (2004) presented an innovative experimental
design to study the behavioural arguments (De-Bondt and Thaler, 1985; Hirshleifer, 2001; Shleifer,
2000) that heterogeneity in traders’ sophistications could explain market-wide anomalies. To do
so, they embedded the Monty Hall problem into an asset market experiment.7 Their design can be
summarised with the following thought experiment. Assume that there exist an asset that allows
you to switch doors in the Monty Hall problem for a winning prize of $100 - after you had made
your initial choice and the non-prize door is opened. A Unsophisticated type would wrongly judge
the probability of winning the prize through switching doors at 1/2 and value the asset at $50. A
Sophisticated type would realise that the probability of winning the prize through switching doors
is in fact 2/3 and value the asset at $67. Focusing on mean prices, Kluger and Wyatts (2004)
found that when all subjects in the market (6 subjects each market) were Unsophisticated - as
judge by their behaviours in the Monty Hall problem, the mean price in the market was close to 50.
However, when there were at least two Sophisticated subjects in the market, the mean price was
close to 67.8 The Monty Hall problem is of course slightly di↵erent to the decisional task proposed
4Given that in Weber (2001) experiments, the game ends at any period whereby a player chooses “Black”, this
presents an interesting problem in classifying behaviours at instances where the game had ended prematurely. To
overcome this problem, Weber considered a player to have adhered to the optimal choices, if he had not deviated at
the period which the game had ended.
5Weber (2001) results could be of independent interest as his subject pool included Caltech undergraduate and
graduate students. Caltech students are often known for their skills in logical reasoning problems (Camerer, 2003).
6Bayer and Chan (2007) results are slightly more di cult to interpret as they reported on “rationalizable be-
haviours”. Such behaviours might also include those that are inconsistent with the optimal choices.
7The Monty Hall problem is from the TV gameshow “Let’s Make A Deal” where the Host, Monty Hall, hides a
winning prize behind three closed doors. A contestant is invited to choose one of the doors to open, but before doing
so, Monty is committed to opening a non-prize door. Thereafter Monty presents the contestant the opportunity to
switch their choice to the other unopened door. The dominant strategy here is for the contestant to always switch
since the probability of winning the prize by doing so is 2/3.
8Kluger and Wyatts (2004) suggest that their findings were due to Bertrand competition between two Sophisticated
subjects. This explanation is challenge by Asparouhova et al. (2012) who questioned why Unsophisticated subjects
do not participate in the Bertrand competition, and if they do so, why wouldn’t prices converge to the incorrect
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in this paper, since it does not involve strategic interactions. Their research also did not focus
on the allocation of assets but suggest that players’ sophistications could be determinants of their
pricing behaviours.
II. Experimental Design & Equilibrium Analysis
Three treatments are considered in this paper, BASE1, BASE2 and TRADE. However, only
in TRADE were players allowed to trade their participation rights to the game. To motivate
the experimental design, we will first present a generalised framework that is applicable to all
treatments. Thereafter, we will show how the treatments vary and finally, the equilibrium analysis
of each treatment.9
A. The Generalised Framework
In the generalised framework, tokens will represent players’ participation rights to the game.
There are two distinct stages, the pre-game stage, where players trade tokens, followed by the game
stage, where players perform the decisional tasks in the game. Let 1G 2 {0, 1} be an exogenous
parameter that determines if players are permitted to enter the pre-game stage. The generalised
framework will begin with following parameters.
There are N = {1, 2, ..., n} set hats with M = {1, 2, ...,m} set members under each hat. Let
player ij refer to the j 2 M member of hat i 2 N . Nature chooses the true state s 2 S ⌘
⇥i2NHi \ {R1, R2, ..., Rn}, where Hi 2 {Bi, Ri} denotes hat i’s colour - Black(B) and Red(R).
There exist a common prior over S where each state s0 2 S is equally likely. For any state s 2 S,
denote Y (s) = {1, 2, .., y} ✓ N as the set of B hats.
Each player observes all other hats’ colour but his own. Denote bij (s) 2 {0, 1, 2, ..., n   1}
as the total number of B hats that player ij observes for any s 2 S - this refers to player ij ’s
private information.10 In addition, players are also publicly informed that the true state consist
of “at least one B hat”. Since players under the same hat must make the same observations,
bij (s) = bij0 (s) = bi(s) for any j, j
0 2 M , i 2 N and s 2 S. Finally, each player is endowed with
one token and a working capital of L¯  0, issued as an interest-free loan.
A.1. The Pre-Game Stage
Players only enter the pre-game stage if 1G = 1. Here, players are allowed to trade tokens
but only with those other players under the same hat. This results in n markets in simultaneous
equilibrium.
9Due to the treatments considered in this paper, the experimental design involves features that are di↵erent from
those previous experiments by Weber (2001) and Bayer and Chan (2007). Thus direct comparisons to their results
will not be prudent.
10Alternatively, one could employ Aumann (1999) sematic approach where each player’s knowledge of the true
state is represented by the information partition Pij over S. Such an approach might be more precise but it makes
the discussion more taxing with no obvious benefits. Nevertheless, the analysis will be identical.
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Table I. Generic Token Redemption Rate ( ij ) for Each Player ij
Hi = Bi Hi = Ri
eij = ab µ   (tij   1) µ   (tij   1)  ↵
eij = ar µ   (tij   1)  ↵ µ   (tij   1)
operations. In the absence of short-sales, let pi   0 denote the token transaction price in market i 2
N , xij 2 {0, 1, 2, ...,m} denote player ij ’s after transaction inventory of tokens and Lij   0 denote
player ij ’s after transaction holding of capital. Assume that token inventories are public information
and L¯ is su ciently large to never be binding. If xij = 0, players’ payo↵s are immediately computed
- to be discussed later.
A.2. The Game Stage
Only players with at least one token (xij > 0) may enter the game stage, where they each face
the decisional task of resolving their hats’ colour. There are t = 1, 2, .., n+1 discrete periods, where
at each period t < n + 1, players are simultaneously presented with the question “Do you know
your hat colour?”, to which they must independently and simultaneously reply with the following
actions: “My Hat is R” (ar), “My Hat is B” (ab) or “No, I don’t Yet Know” (an). The rules are
such that each player (and that player only) ends the game stage at the period tij whereby the
action eij 2 {ar, ab} was chosen. This implies that players only proceed to the next period if he had
chosen an in the previous period. To ensure that all players must eventually end the game stage,
players can only choose from the actions ab and ar if they make it to the n+1 period. Finally, any
action chosen in period t will be public information in period t+ 1.
A.3. Payo↵s
Players’ payo↵s (⇧ij ) are computed when they have either ended the pre-game stage with
xij = 0 tokens or ended the game stage with choosing eij 2 {ar, ab}. Here, the true state of nature
is revealed, the players’ loans (L¯) are repaid and their tokens are each redeemed at the heterogenous
rate  (µ,  ,↵, Hi, tij , eij )   0 - in a slight abuse of notation I will write  (µ,  ,↵, Hi, tij , eij ) as  ij .
Table I depicts the generic tokens redemption rate for each player ij , where µ > (1/2)↵ > (n+1)  >
0. The redemption rate can be summarised as followed. Each token has an initial value of µ that
decreases by   each time the player chooses an. In addition, the token’s value decreases by ↵ if he
had incorrectly guessed his hat colour - choosing ab (ar) if Hi = Ri (Hi = Bi). The payo↵s are
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therefore determined as11,12
⇧ij =
8>>><>>>:
(Lij   L¯) +  ijxij =  ij
(Lij   L¯) +  ijxij = pi + ( ij   pi)xij
(Lij   L¯) = pi
if 1G = 0 & xij = 1
if 1G = 1 & xij > 0
if 1G = 1 & xij = 0
(1)
This completes the description of the generalised framework.
B. How the Treatments Vary
When 1G = 1 and m   1, players enter a market (pre-game stage) where they trade their
participation rights (tokens) for performing the decisional tasks in the game stage. Since the
markets in the pre-game stage will only consist of those players under the same hat, they must
have the same information (bi(s)) and are hence “competing” for the same decisional task. Players
who sold their tokens are compensated by the sales revenue (pi) for avoiding the game stage. And
since players’ tokens are redeemed at the end of the treatment, purchasing another players’ tokens
not only buys over his participation rights, but also his potential payo↵s in the game.
For any fixed n   2, variations in the generalised framework can be achieved by specifying
the number of members under each hat (m   1) and whether players are permitted to enter the
pre-game stage (1G). The three treatments are di↵erentiated as followed:
BASE1: n = 3, m = 1 and 1G = 0.
BASE2: n = 3, m = 6 and 1G = 0.
TRADE: n = 3, m = 6 and 1G = 1.
Players in BASE1 and BASE2 hence always enter the game stage with exactly one token. BASE1
refers to the primitive description of the Red Hat Puzzle. TRADE is the central interest of this
paper, where players are permitted to trade their participation rights to performing the decisional
tasks in the game stage. Since TRADE and BASE1 di↵er on bothm and 1G, BASE2 was introduced
to control for any potential di↵erence that might be driven by changes in m.13
C. Equilibrium Analysis
The following assumptions are made in the equilibrium analysis (a) All players are risk-neutral,
(b) There is common knowledge of Rationality and (c) There is common knowledge of Sophisti-
cation. Adapting Myerson (1997, p.2) description of players, we refer to rational players as those
who seek to maximise their own payo↵s, and sophisticated players as those who knows everything
11When 1G = 0, we must have it that L¯ = Lij and xij = 1 since players are not permitted to enter the pre-game
stage.
12Since players are each endowed with one token, their net transactions in the pre-game stage can be denoted as
vij = xij   1, where the market clearing conditions require that
P
j vij = 0 for all i 2 N . As such, we can rewrite
players’ holding of capital as Lij = L¯  pivij .
13Physical limitations in the laboratory restrict the BASE2 and TRADE treatments to six players under each hat.
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there is to know about the game and makes the same logically conclusions as a designer of the
game would make. Given these assumptions, players may start the treatment uncertain of their
hats’ colour, but they would always know the process of ascertaining their hats’ colour in the game
stage. We will first detail the equilibrium analysis of BASE1 and thereafter extend the discussions
to BASE2 and TRADE. Finally, the equilibrium payo↵s will be derived for all treatments.
C.1. Equilibrium Analysis of BASE1
Players enter the game stage with exactly one token and seek to maximise their token redemption
rate since ⇧ij =  ij . To show the optimal choices, it is useful to first identify the dominant action
at each period t for players who are certain and uncertain of their hats’ colour. In the former case,
the dominant action is obvious, choose ab or ar if they know their hats to be B or R respectively -
choosing an incurs an additional “cost” of   with no obvious benefits. The dominant action in the
latter case is less obvious. By Bayes rule, uncertain players must hold equal posterior to being under
either hat colours - this will be clearer in the later discussions. Here, players at period t face an
inter-period tradeo↵ between (OptionA) Ending the game stage with eij 2 {ab, ar} and (OptionB)
Choosing an and ascertaining their hats’ colour at some later period t0 = t + 1, t + 2, .., n + 1.
The expected token redemption rate with OptionA and OptionB are µ    (t   1)   (1/2)↵ and
µ    (t0   1) respectively. Given that (1/2)↵ > (n + 1) , OptionA will always be dominated by
OptionB for any t0 = t+ 1, t+ 2, .., n+ 1. Therefore uncertain players should always choose an.
We are now in the position to describe the indirect communication (Geanakoplos and Pole-
marchakis, 1982) process by which players ascertain their hats’ colour. For this we return to the
illustration introduced in Section I where n = 3 and s = {B1, B2, B3}. Each player begins period
1 of the game stage observing bi(s) = 2 and remains uncertain. Since each state in S is equally
likely, players applying Bayes rule must assign equal posterior to being under either hat colours.
Given the public announcement, it can only be common knowledge that there is at least one B
hat.14 However, each player privately knows there to be at least two B hats. Uncertain players
in period 1 thus choose an. At period 2, having observed the public information - the previous
period’s actions, each player reasons that if there was only one B hat, then some player must have
observed no B hats, ascertained his hat’s colour to be B and choose ab in period 1. Since no one
had done so, there cannot be only one B hat in the true state. Of course each player already knew
this and there should be no revisions to their posteriors. Again uncertain players choose an. Finally
at period 3, given the public information, each player reasons that if there were only two B hats,
then some players must have observed one other B hats, ascertained their hats’ colour to be B,
and choose ab in period 2. Since no player had done done so, there cannot be only two B hat in
the true state and given that bi(s) = 2, each player ascertains their own hat to be B. Players thus
choose ab in period 3 and their tokens are each redeemed at the rate µ  2 .
The above discussions can be extended to any n   2 coloured hats and the equilibrium prediction
14Alternatively, Aumann (1976) agreement theorem, show that the only event in S which can be commonly knowl-
edge must include the entire states of nature S.
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is for players to ascertain their own hat colour at period bi(s)+1. The optimal choices in the game
stage are for players to choose an at all periods t < bi(s) + 1, and at period bi(s) + 1, choose ab if
i 2 Y (s) and ar if i /2 Y (s). Adherence to the optimal choices will result in players’ token being
redeemed at the Pareto optimal equilibrium rate  ⇤ij = µ  bi(s) .
Notice role that the common knowledge assumptions play in the equilibrium discussions. If
they are not met, players cannot exclude the possibility that an action chosen by some other player
is due to unsophisticated or irrational behaviours. However, given that adherence to the optimal
choices is Pareto optimal, each player should strictly prefer the common knowledge assumptions to
be met.
C.2. Equilibrium Analysis of BASE2
BASE2 only di↵ers from BASE1 in the number of players under each hat. However, players
under each hat have the same private information (bi(s)), face the same decisional task and choose
their actions both independently and simultaneously. This implies that the optimal choices for each
player must be identical at all periods, for players under the same hat: Choose an at all periods
t < bi(s) + 1, and at period bi(s) + 1, choose ab if i 2 Y (s) and ar if i /2 Y (s). Thus, increasing the
number of players under each hat, has no implications on the optimal choices in the game stage
and adherence will result in tokens being redeemed at the Pareto optimal rate  ⇤ij = µ  bi(s) .
C.3. Equilibrium Analysis of TRADE
TRADE only di↵ers from BASE2 on the availability of the pre-game stage. Hence, the equilib-
rium predictions in TRADE will pertain to the equilibrium prices in markets i 2 N of the pre-game
stage and the optimal choices in the game stage. To show the equilibrium predictions in TRADE,
we will first begin with the game stage and thereafter work backwards to the pre-game stage.
Players in TRADE enter the game stage with xij   1 tokens. The equilibrium discussions in
BASE2, suggest that the number of players under each hat has no influence on the optimal choices.
How about the token ownerships? The answer as it turns out is no. This is because if adherence
to the optimal choices is Pareto optimal for players with one token (as in BASE1 and BASE2), it
must also be Pareto optimal for players with more than one token.
By backward deduction, players in the markets of the pre-game stage observing bi(s) should
expect to ascertain their hats’ colour in period bi(s) + 1 of the game stage. Given the token
redemption structure, whatever colour it may be, players should hence expect their tokens to be
redeemed at  ⇤ij = µ   bi(s)  and by this logic, should only purchase additional tokens at prices
pi  µ   bi(s)  or sell tokens at pi > µ   bi(s) . Since players only trade tokens with the other
players under the same hat, this establishes the equilibrium price p⇤i =  ⇤ij = µ   bi(s)  in each
market i 2 N , where players are indi↵erent between buying or selling tokens.
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C.4. Equilibrium Payo↵s
Given the equilibrium discussion, the equilibrium payo↵ can be derived for players in each
treatment by substituting p⇤i and  ⇤ij where relevant
⇧⇤ij =
8>>><>>>:
 ⇤ij = µ  bi(s) 
p⇤i + ( ⇤ij   p⇤i )xij = µ  bi(s) 
p⇤i = µ  bi(s) 
if 1G = 0 & xij = 1
if 1G = 1 & xij > 0
if 1G = 1 & xij = 0
(2)
Notice that the equilibrium payo↵ (⇧⇤ij ) only depends on bi(s) and is independent of the treatment
variations. For any fixed n, the treatments are therefore payo↵ equivalent for any player observing
bi(s).
III. Test Hypotheses
This paper seeks to investigate the conventional wisdom that markets should allocate the rights
for performing decisional task to those players who are best suited to perform the task, in this
case, those who know the optimal choices in the game stage. The equilibrium analysis suggest that
behaviours of players in the game stage are independent of the treatment variations. How therefore
would the experimental design test the conventional wisdom?
For this we return to the main features of the game stage. (i) Adherence to the optimal choices
are Pareto optimal for all players in the game Stage and (ii) Adherence to the optimal choices when
bi(s) > 0 requires players to employ logical and epistemological reasonings - when players observe
bi(s) = 0 the decisional task is trivial and obvious. As such, if players are heterogeneous in their
sophistications as suggested by previous experimental adaption of the Red Hat Puzzle (Weber,
2001; Bayer and Chan, 2007), then markets in the pre-game stage of TRADE should allocate the
participation rights (tokens) to those players who know the optimal choices.
To see why this might be so, assume that the population of players consist of both Sophisticated
and Unsophisticated types. When bi(s) > 0, the Unsophisticated types, limited by their abilities to
know the optimal choices, do not expect to ever ascertain their true hat colour in the game stage.
The dominant behaviour for such types would be to randomise between ab and ar in the very first
period of the game stage with the expected token redemption rate of µ   (1/2)↵.15 If presented
the opportunity to enter the pre-game stage, such types should only purchase additional tokens at
prices pi  µ   (1/2)↵ and sell their token at prices pi > µ   (1/2)↵. Assume for now that the
Sophisticated types alway expect to ascertain their true hat colour in the game stage. They should
thus only purchase tokens at prices pi   ⇤ij = µ bi(s)  and sell their token at pi >  ⇤ij = µ bi(s) .
Since (1/2)↵ > (n+ 1) , at prices pi 2 (µ  (1/2)↵, µ  bi(s) ], it is therefore incentive compatible
for Sophisticated types to purchase tokens and Unsophisticated types to sell tokens. Furthermore,
15Choosing an is dominated as they incur a cost of   with no expected revisions to their posterior in the later
periods.
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Sophisticated types should know that given the availability of pre-game stage, the only players
who will eventually enter the game stage must also be Sophisticated types. Thus markets in the
pre-game stage should result in the allocation of the rights for performing the decisional task in
the game stage to those who know the optimal choices.
To make comparison treatments, the following two terms are introduced
Adherence Rate: The ratio of players in the game stage who had adhered to the optimal choices.
E ciency Rate: The ratio of tokens redeemed at the Pareto optimal equilibrium rate µ bi(s) .16
Both terms focus on the behaviours of players in the game stage and whether they had adhered
to the optimal choices. However, they di↵er on the weights assigned to the players’ behaviours in
respective treatments. The adherence rate assigns uniform weights to the behaviours of all players
in the game stage, whilst the e ciency rate assigns greater weights to the behaviours of players
with more tokens. These di↵erences are irrelevant for BASE1 and BASE2, since players always
enter the game stage with exactly one token - the adherence and e ciency rates must be identical.
However, this will not necessarily be true for players in TRADE, as they first enter the pre-game
stage. Since comparisons between treatments should account for the activities in the pre-game
stage, thus the e ciency rate would be a more suitable measure of aggregated performances in the
respective treatments. This brings us to the following test hypotheses
H1: The e ciency rate in BASE1 is similar to that of BASE2.
H2: The e ciency rate in TRADE is higher than those in BASE1 and BASE2.
H3: The likelihood of adherence for subjects in TRADE is increasing with token ownership, at
instances where bi(s) = 1, 2.
H4: The likelihood of adherence for subjects in TRADE is strictly higher for subjects who had
purchased tokens at prices pi 2 (µ   (1/2)↵, µ   bi(s) ] relative to subjects who had purchased
tokens at pi /2 (µ  (1/2)↵, µ  bi(s) ] or had not purchased tokens, at instances where bi(s) = 1, 2.
H1 serves as an empirical warm up where we examine the marginal influences of increasing m
on the aggregated performances in the game stage. Building on this finding, we can thus proceed
to H2, where we examine the main research question of this paper. If the conventional wisdom is
to hold, we should expect the aggregated performances in TRADE to be significantly higher than
those in BASE1 and BASE2. This is simply due to the fact that markets should result in the
allocation of tokens to those players who know the optimal choices.
H3 and H4 seeks to provide support for any potential findings from H2. If markets did result
in the allocation of tokens to those players who know the optimal choices, we should expect the
likelihood of adherence to the optimal choices to be increasing with token ownership for subjects
16If a player with three tokens was had adhered to the optimal choices, then three tokens would have been redeemed
at the equilibrium rate.
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Table II. Demographics of Subjects by Schools Enrolled
School BASE1 BASE2 TRADE
Business School 16 13 23
Engineering, Mathematics & Physical Science 3 1 5
Humanities 9 6 0
Life & Environmental Science 4 3 2
Social Sciences & International Studies 1 10 6
Others 3 3 0
Total 36 36 36
in TRADE. In addition, since the allocation of tokens with markets is due to the di↵erence in
valuations amongst subjects, we should therefore expect subjects’ token pricing behaviours to be
related to their behaviours in the game stage. As the optimal choices are trivial when players
observe bi(s) = 0, the potential e↵ects of markets in the pre-game stage should only be evidential
when subjects observe bi(s) = 1, 2.
IV. Experimental Procedures
Two experimental sessions, were conducted for each treatment. Each session had involved
18 inexperienced subjects, recruited on a first come basis from the undergraduate cohort at the
University of Exeter, through the ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) software. Table II reports on the subjects’
demography in each treatment, by the schools they were enrolled into - Economic students study at
the Business School. Although subjects had no formal training in game theory, those with stronger
background in economics, engineering, mathematic or physics may potentially have some advantage
with abstract reasoning problems due to their background training. This will be controlled for in
the econometric analysis.
The experiments were conducted with the Z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) software and employed
non-neutral framing of the pre-game and game stages. Each session had consisted of one practice
round and ten paying rounds, where subjects’ payo↵s were denoted in the fictitious currency, ECU.
The following payo↵ parameters were employed: µ = 950,   = 50, ↵ = 700 and L¯ = 6000.
Subjects’ overall payo↵s were determined as the average over all ten rounds and converted into
cash at the exchange rate of 67ECU/£1 in the BASE1 and BASE2 treatments, and 100ECU/£1
in the TRADE treatments.17 The average duration of the BASE1 and BASE2 sessions were 95
minutes, whilst the TRADE sessions were 130 minutes. In addition to their experimental earnings,
subjects also received a show-up fee of £5 in the BASE1 and BASE2 sessions, and £8 in the
TRADE sessions. Including the show-up fees, the average cash earnings were £16.64, £16.91 and
£16.12 in the BASE1, BASE2 and TRADE treatments, respectively. Before collecting their cash
17The di↵erence in exchange rates was introduced to control for any potential income e↵ect due to a higher show-up
fee being paid in the TRADE sessions.
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payments, subjects were required to complete the Cognitive Reflective Test (Frederick, 2005) and
self-declare any prior familiarity with the Red Hat Puzzle or similar problems.18
For e cient comparisons between treatments, two sequences of states (s 2 S) were randomly
generated prior to the experimental proper. This was introduced to ensure that at each round of
the respective treatments, there were the same number of subjects who observed zero, one or two
black hats.
Prior to experiment proper, we conducted a pilot test on the software and the instructions. The
pilot test had raised some interesting challenges with the experimental design, which prompted
us to make minor modifications to the design of BASE1 and BASE2. In the following, we will
first detail the modification made and thereafter the experimental procedures in the respective
treatments.
A. Minor Modifications to BASE1 and BASE2
The pilot session was based on the BASE2 treatment design. Here subjects were sometimes
observed to be adhering to the optimal choices despite the fact that they were following some
randomisation process - through their feedbacks.
To overcome the likelihood that observed adherences were purely coincidental, we included an
“outside option” for subjects to discretely end the game stage in a manner that does not a↵ect
the equilibrium analysis of the game. In addition to the actions ab, ar and an, subjects could also
choose the outside option with the action “Toss a Coin, I will never know (ac)”. If the subjects
chooses ac, he ends the game stage with a fixed cost of 250 ECU, in addition to any other deductions
incurred when choosing an. In doing so, he assigns the computer to choose the action ab or ar on
his behalf - with equal probability. The computer’s choice will have no consequence on his payo↵s.
For example if subject A choose an in the first period and ac in the second period - the computer
had chosen ab on his behalf, his token will be redeemed at the rate of 950-50-250=650 ECU. All
other subjects would have observed that A had chosen ab in the second period. However, only the
experimenter would know that subject A had chosen ac.
The action ac will always be dominated in the equilibrium analysis and does not influence
the optimal choices. The expected token redemption rate with adhering to the optimal choices is
950  50(bi(s)), with choosing ac at any period t is 700  50(t  1), and randomising with either ab
or ar for uncertain players is 600 50(t 1). Thus for subjects who do not expect to ever ascertain
their hats’ colour, the action ac dominates all other actions. The outside option was omitted from
TRADE, since an equivalent outside option already exist, the ability to sell your token and avoid
the game stage altogether.
18The Cognitive Reflective Test involves three question that triggers the wrong “instinctive” answer. (Q1) A bat
and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? (Q2) If it takes
5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? (Q3) In a lake,
there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire
lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake?
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B. BASE1
Upon entering the experiment, subjects were allowed 40 minutes to read through the instructions
(see Appendix A) and complete a questionnaire, testing their understanding of the experimental
design. Thereafter, subjects were randomly paired with two other subjects into a group and re-
mained within the same group for the duration of the experiment - total of 12 group. At the start
each round, subjects were randomly assigned to one of three hats and were presented with the other
hats’ colours. Subjects were also informed that there is at least one black hat and proceed directly
into the game stage. To avoid confusion, the notion of tokens were omitted from the subjects’
instructions. The game stage proceed as discussed and each period had lasted a maximum of 240
seconds. At each period t > 1, subjects were presented on their computer screens the period t  1
actions of all other subjects within their group. A limitation of the software design was such that
subjects had to proceed through the periods together. This meant that subjects who had chosen
the actions ab, ar or ac were facing a blank screen as they waited for other subjects to proceed
through the periods. However, subjects were observed to have taken the opportunity to “sketch”
their behaviours in the game.
C. BASE2
The sessions di↵er from the BASE1 sessions in the following: Each group consisted of 18
subjects, with 6 subjects under each hat (see Appendix B for the instructions) - total of 2 groups.
However, subjects were again randomly assign to one of three hats in each round. At each period
t > 1, subjects were presented on their computer screens a table that depicted the aggregated
period t  1 actions, by all subjects in the respective hats. For example, subjects under hat 1, will
observe the relative frequencies of the actions ab, ar and an, chosen by all subjects under hat 2 and
3.
D. TRADE
Each group again consisted of 18 subjects with 6 subjects under each hat (see Appendix C for
the instructions) - total of 2 groups. When the round begins, subjects first observed the other
hats’ colours. Thereafter, subjects enter the pre-game stage, where trade was facilitated through
a continuous double auction mechanism that lasted for 120 seconds - the market only consisted of
the other subjects under the same hat. Here, a price ceiling of 1200 ECU was imposed on the bid
and ask prices, to restrict subjects from intentionally making losses. This also ensures that each
subject was not capital constrained from purchasing all other tokens within his market.
After the pre-game stage had ended, only subjects with at least one token entered the game
stage - subjects without any tokens were able observe the proceedings of the game stage on their
computer screens but prevented from participating. The game stage proceeded as described in
the BASE1, with the exception that the action ac was not available and the public information
available to subjects at each period t > 1. Here, their computerised screens depicted the aggregated
14
period t 1 actions, by all subjects under the respective hats ranked by their token ownership. For
example, subjects under hat 1, will observe the relative frequencies of the actions ab, ar and an
chosen by those subjects under hat 2 and 3 with one, two, three,..., six tokens.
Since the loan of 6000 ECU had to be repaid at the end of the round, some subjects may incur
negative payo↵s - 20 observed bankruptcy out of the 360 instances. A lower bound of 0 ECU was
introduced to restrict subjects from making negative payo↵s in any round.
V. Results
In the following discussions, we will omit the su x i and j, and make references to those
instance where experimental subjects observed b = 0, 1, 2 black hats. It is worth to remember that
the experimental procedures ensured that there will be the same number of subjects starting each
round in the respective treatments, observing b black hats. However, the ability to trade tokens
meant that only a subset of subjects in TRADE would have eventually entered the game stage.
Nevertheless, there will still be the same number of tokens due for redemption at the equilibrium
rate  ⇤ = 950 50b. For these reasons, comparisons of aggregated performances between treatments
will focus on the e ciency rates.
In the following sub-sections, we will first present the aggregated performances in all treatments
to examine H1 and H2. Thereafter, we will focus on the prices and token ownerships in TRADE
to give an overview to H3 and H4. Finally, we will revisit H2 in the econometric analysis, where
H3 and H4 will be jointly evaluated.
A. Aggregated Performances
Table III reports on the e ciency rates in BASE1, BASE2 and TRADE. Each cell depicts the
total number of tokens redeemed at the equilibrium rate  ⇤, with the ratio in parenthesis. The
final column of each panel depicts the pooled e ciency rate for that round and the final row, over
all rounds.
Interpretation of BASE1’s and BASE2’s data should be straightforward. For example in round
1 of BASE1, there were 24 subjects who began the game stage observing b = 1. However, only 16
of those subjects were found to have adhered to the optimal choices, and thus only 16 tokens were
redeemed at  ⇤ = 900  50(1) = 900 ECU. The e ciency rate was thus computed as 16/24 ⇡ 0.67.
Interpretation of TRADE’s data is less straightforward. In the round 1 of TRADE, there were
again 24 subjects who began the round observing b = 1. However, after trading tokens in the
pre-game stage, only 19 subjects had eventually entered the game stage. Out of these 19 subjects,
11 subjects were found to have adhered to the optimal choices but 12 tokens were redeemed at
the equilibrium rate - this implies that one of the 11 subjects must be owning two tokens. The
e ciency rate was computed to be 12/24 = 0.5.
Pairwise comparisons between treatments will be made for the pooled e ciency rates at each b
instances and the aggregated e ciency rate over all b instances. We will employ both Chi-Square
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and Fisher’s Exact one-tail tests, where the p-values are reported as ⇢ and ⇢ˆ respectively.
First consider the observations in BASE1 and BASE2. At instances where subjects observed
b = 0, the pooled e ciency rates in both treatments were unity. This should not be surprising,
since given the public information that “there is at least one black hat”, each subject should have
immediately ascertained their hats to be black and choose ab in the first period. When subjects
observed b = 1, the optimal choices become less trivial and required them to employ logical and
epistemological reasoning. However, at most instances, the majority of subjects had understood
the optimal choices. Here, the pooled e ciency rates were found to be 0.70 and 0.68 in BASE1
and BASE2 respectively - the di↵erence was not found to be significant (⇢ = 0.741, ⇢ˆ = 0.413).
At the most complex task of the game stage, where subjects observed b = 2, the pooled e ciency
rates were now found to be 0.14 and 0.15 in BASE1 and BASE2 respectively - the di↵erence was
again not found to be significant (⇢ = 0.859, ⇢ˆ = 0.500). The fall in e ciency rates from b = 1 to
b = 2 is fairly obvious. This suggest that the decisional task at instances where b = 2 might have
been too complicated for most subjects. This is evidential in their behaviours, where 50% and 40%
of the observations in BASE1 and BASE2 respectively, had resulted in subjects deviating at the
very first period of the game stage. Finally, the aggregated e ciency rates over all rounds and b
instances were found to be 0.54 and 0.53 in BASE1 and BASE2 respectively. This was again not
found to be significantly di↵erent (⇢ = 0.881, ⇢ˆ = 0.470).
Result 1: Consistent with H1, the aggregated e ciency rates over all observations in BASE1 and
BASE2 were not found to be significantly di↵erent. Furthermore, the pooled e ciency rates at
instances in BASE1 and BASE2 where subjects observed b = 0, b = 1 and b = 2 black hats, were
not found to be significantly di↵erent.
To some extend, Result 1 is convenient since it suggest that increasing the number of subjects
under each hat has little or no obvious influences on their behaviours in the game stage. Therefore,
if the e ciency rates in TRADE were significantly di↵erent to those of BASE1 and BASE2, this
could likely be attributed to the market allocation in the pre-game stage of TRADE.
Now consider the observations in TRADE. At instances where subjects observed b = 0, the
e ciency rate was unity. However, at instances where subjects observed b = 1, the pooled e ciency
rate was now found to be 0.49, significantly lower and di↵erent to those reported in BASE1 and
BASE2 (⇢ < 0.001 and ⇢ˆ < 0.001 in all comparisons). At instances where subjects observed b = 2,
the e ciency rate was found to be 0.18. This might seem higher than those reported in BASE1
and BASE2, but the di↵erences were not found to be significant (⇢ > 0.393 and ⇢ˆ > 0.495 in all
comparisons). Finally, the aggregated e ciency rate over all rounds and b instances in TRADE
was found to be 0.44, significant lower than those reported in BASE1 and BASE2 (⇢ < 0.018 and
⇢ˆ < 0.012 in all comparisons).
Result 2: Contrary to H2, the aggregated e ciency rate over all observations in TRADE was
found to be significantly lower than those in BASE1 and BASE2. The di↵erences were primarily
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Table IV. Adherence Rates by Token Ownership (TRADE)
Tokens b = 0 b = 1 b = 2 Agg.
1 10(1.0) 47(.67) 12(.32) 69(.59)
2 9(1.0) 16(.47) 1(.05) 26(.41)
3 3(1.0) 4(.33) 3(.33) 10(.42)
4 - 1(.50) 0(.00) 1(.17)
5 1(1.0) 0(.00) - 1(.33)
6 - - 0(.00) 0(.00)
Agg. 23(1.0) 68(.57) 16(0.23) 107(.50)
driven by the lower pooled e ciency rates at instances where subjects in TRADE observed b = 1.
At other instances where subjects observed b = 0 or b = 2, the pooled e ciency rates were not found
to be significantly di↵erent from those of BASE1 or BASE2.
Taken together, Results 1 and 2 suggest that allowing subjects to trade their participation rights
to the game stage had actually worsen aggregated performances, relative to the control treatments.
Furthermore, comparisons between treatments suggest that such di↵erences were primarily at-
tributed to instances in TRADE where subjects observed b = 1 black hats. How might we reconcile
such discrepancies? Perhaps this finding is symptomatic of the complexity in the decisional task.
When b = 0, the task was too trivial, and we do not observe any di↵erences between the treatments.
When b = 2, the task was too complex for most subjects, thus any marginal influence from the
ability to trade tokens was minimal. As such, the “tipping point” lies at instances where subjects
observed b = 1. This raises the question as to why the aggregated performances in TRADE might
be lower than those in BASE1 and BASE2.
With repeated games, the reader might be concerned with potential learning over rounds. We
find little evidence of learning. The aggregated e ciency rates over rounds I-V were found to be
0.55, 0.55 and 0.44 in BASE1, BASE2 and TRADE respectively. The same rates over rounds VI-X
were found to be 0.53, 0.52 and 0.44 respectively.
B. Behaviours and Token Ownership (TRADE)
A plausible explanation to Result 2 is that markets in the pre-game stage of TRADE had often
resulted in the allocation of participation rights (tokens) to those subjects who did not know the
optimal choices (Unsophisticated types). To investigate this explanation, we report on Table IV,
the adherence rates by token ownership.
For example, there were 70 instances where subjects in TRADE observing b = 1 had entered
the game stage with exactly one token, out of which subjects were found to have adhered to the
optimal choices in 47 instances - the adherence rate was therefore 47/70 ⇡ 0.67.
At instances where b = 0, the ownership of tokens had no influence on the adherence rates.
However, at instances where b = 1 or b = 2, the adherence rates were found to decrease with token
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Figure 1. Mean Prices in Pre-game Stage of TRADE
ownership. This observations are clearly contradictory to H3. However, they lend some support
to the explanation that markets had resulted in the allocation of tokens to those subjects who did
not know the optimal choices.
C. Prices and Behaviours in Game Stage (TRADE)
How might we explain the observations in Table IV? For some insights, we studied the prices of
tokens in markets of the pre-game stage. Figure 1 present the mean transaction prices in markets
where subjects had observed b = 0, 1, 2 black hats. The horizontal line in each panel indicates the
equilibrium price p⇤ = 950   50b. The weighted volume of trade were found to be 1.11, 0.80 and
0.82 (total number of trades as a ratio of the the total number of tokens available for trade) in
markets where subjects observed b = 0, 1, 2 respectively. Given that each market only consisted of
six subjects, there seems to be a robust number of transactions.
Mean prices were frequently found to be above the equilibrium price - 57%, 46% and 71% of
observations in markets where subjects observed b = 0, 1, 2 respectively - which are indicative of
price “bubbles” in the markets. Such price bubbles could have severe implications on the allocative
outcomes of markets, since at prices p > 950  50b, sophisticated types should strictly prefer to sell
their tokens and avoid the game stage altogether.19
However, if price bubbles had led to tokens being frequently purchased by subjects who might
19This raises the question as to the types of subjects who might be purchasing tokens at such elevated prices.
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Figure 2. Average Purchase Price (p¨) and Adherence to Optimal Choices (TRADE)
otherwise not known the optimal choices, then we should expect to find some relationship between
subjects’ pricing behaviours in the market and their eventual behaviours in the game stage. If
such a relationship does not exist, then price bubbles could be an independent phenomenon that is
inconsequential to the behaviours of subjects in the game stage. We hence derived for each subject
in TRADE, his average purchase price (p¨), which was computed as the sum of all his purchasing
expenditure in the market divided by the total number of tokens purchased.20
Figure 2 presents the plot of p¨ and behaviours in the game stage. Each observation indicates
the p¨ for an individual subject and whether he was found to have adhered to the optimal choices
in the game stage (the numeral 1 indicates that the subject had adhered). This of course excludes
all observation where subjects were inactive - did not purchase tokens in the market - or had sold
all their tokens.
It is di cult to see any linear relationship between adherence and p¨, and there is no theoretical
justification for one. However, the economic intuition in TRADE is for Sophisticated types to be
purchasing tokens at prices p 2 (600, 950  50(b)] at instances where b > 0. We hence partition the
observations into two clusters, those with p¨ 2 (600, 950   50(b)] - the area between the horizontal
lines on each panel mark out this region - and p¨ /2 (600, 950  50(b)]. In doing so, we notice some
20As trade was facilitated through a continuous double auction mechanism, subjects could purchase and sell token
simultaneously within the trading period. Thus the average purchase price seeks to normalise his overall purchasing
activities within the trading period. One could alternatively consider the average sale price, however we prefer to
work with the purchasing activities since it may better describe a subject’s expected token redemption rate.
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Table V. Adherence Rates by Average Purchase Price (TRADE)
b = 1 b = 2
p¨ 2 (600, 950  50(b)] 27(0.67) 3(0.30)
p¨ /2 (600, 950  50(b)] 6(0.22) 3(0.11)
relationship between p¨ and behaviours of subjects. To see this more clearly, we report on Table
V, the adherence rates at instances where p¨ 2 (600, 950   50(b)] and p¨ /2 (600, 950   50(b)]. One
immediately observes the rates to be higher in the former relative to the latter condition when
b = 1 - 0.67 and 0.22 respectively - and when b = 2 - 0.30 and 0.11 respectively.
Take together these observations provide some support for H4 and suggest that subjects’ pricing
behaviours in TRADE may be related to their behaviours in the game stage. More significantly, it
lends weight to the explanation, that the price bubbles in the markets of TRADE had often resulted
in the allocation of tokens to those subjects who might not have known the optimal choices. These
observations will be formally tested in our econometric analysis.
D. Econometric Analysis
This section employs econometric methods to re-examine the Result 2, and jointly investigate
H3 and H4, whilst controlling for subject specific characteristics. Given that subjects remained
within the same group for the duration of the experiment, we should hence expect the residual
estimates to be highly correlated amongst subjects of the same group but independent from those
of other groups. As such, the approach taken in this paper follows that of Bayer and Chan (2007),
with the three-level hierarchical Generalised Linear Latent and Mixed Model (Rabe-Hesketh et al.,
2005).
The first level refers to observations at round r, the second level refers to subjects indexed by l
and the third level refers to groups indexed by g. To ensure variations in the data, all observations
where subjects observed b = 0 or when subjects did not participate in the game stage were excluded.
This resulted in 827 level-1 variables, 105 level-2 variables and 16 level-3 variables.21 The regression
model adopts a logistic link function
Logit[Prob(yrlg = 1)|xrlg, ⇣(2)lg , ⇣(3)g ] = x0rlg  + ⇣(2)lg + ⇣(3)g (3)
where the dependent variable denotes the adherence to the optimal choice in round r, by subject
l belonging to group g. The model assumes that ⇣(2)lg |xrlg, ⇣(3)g ⇠ N (0, (2)), where  (2) denotes
the between-subject, within-group variances. Furthermore, it assumes that ⇣(3)g |xrlg ⇠ N (0, (3)),
where  (3) denotes the between-group variance. The observations from BASE1 and BASE2 were
pooled together to form the BASE observations. Thereafter interactive dummies were introduced
21Although there were a total of 108 subjects in all treatments, there were three subjects in the TRADE treatment
who had always sold their tokens when they observed b = 1 or b = 2. There were hence only 105 level-2 variables in
the regression.
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to distinguish TRADE observations from those of BASE at instances where subjects observed
b = 1 and b = 2. Five regression models were considered, where the estimation process employs the
adaptive quadrature numerical methods to maximise the marginal log-likelihoods.22 The regression
results are reported on Table VI, where the p-values are presented in parenthesis. The likelihood-
ratio test prefers regression 4 to all other regressions (at the 1% significance level) but the discussions
will make references to regression 5, since it introduces some subject specific coe cients. The
estimates in the respective regression were also found to be consistent with the random-e↵ects
logistic regression results - not reported here.
The discussion henceforth will make references to the average subject, a hypothetical subject
where the coe cient estimates are set to their averages. The log-likelihood of adherence decreases
by 1.38 at instances where b = 1, and increases by 0.69 at instances where b = 2, for an average
subject in TRADE relative to an average subject in BASE. However, only the former was found to
be mildly significant (p-value=0.085).
Result 2’: Consistent with Result 2, the likelihood of adherence for an average subject in TRADE
was significantly lower at instances where b = 1, relative to an average subject in BASE. At instances
where b = 2, no significant e↵ect was observed.
For the average subject in TRADE, the log-likelihood of adherence decrease by 1.13 when b = 1
and by 0.20 when b = 2, for each additional token owned. Again, only the former coe cient was
found to be significant (p-value=0.007). This is consistent with the findings on Table IV, where
adherence rates in TRADE were observed to have decrease with token ownership. However, the
surprise here is such that the coe cients were only significant at instances where subjects observed
b = 1.
Finally, for the average subject in TRADE, the log-likelihood of adherence increases by 2.015
and by 0.029 at instances where b = 1 and b = 2 respectively, when p¨ 2 (600, 950   50(b)],
relative to other instances where subjects were found to be inactive or p¨ /2 (600, 950  50(b)]. Once
again, only the former was found to be significant (p-value=0.002). To confirm this finding, we
also considered an alternative regression where the interactive dummy variables were specified for
subjects in TRADE for p¨ /2 (600, 950   50(b)]. Here the likelihood of adherence was found to
be significantly lower for subjects with p¨ /2 (600, 950   50(b)] at instances where b = 1 but not
significantly di↵erent at instances where b = 2.
This econometric results suggest that after controlling for purchases prices and token ownership,
the likelihood of adherence of an average subject in TRADE is mildly di↵erent to an average subject
in BASE at instances where b = 1 and not significantly di↵erent when b = 2. The regression results
also suggest that price bubbles had lead to the tokens being purchased by subjects who might not
have understood the optimal choices in the game stage. This brings us to the following results
Result 3: Contrary to H3, the likelihood of adherence to the optimal choices was decreasing with
22The adaptive quadrature method was employ to increase computation e ciency and estimation precision (Rabe-
Hesketh et al., 2002).
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Table VI. Econometric Regression Results
Dependent Variable: Adherence to the Optimal Choices
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coe cient Est. Est. Est. Est. Est.
(b = 2)  3.911⇤⇤⇤
(0.000)
 4.327⇤⇤⇤
(0.000)
 3.936⇤⇤⇤
(0.000)
 4.810⇤⇤⇤
(0.000)
 4.831⇤⇤⇤
(0.000)
(b = 1)⇥TRADE  0.936
(0.065)
⇤  0.567
(0.291)
 1.413
(0.010)
⇤⇤  1.010
(0.081)
⇤  1.381
(0.085)
⇤
(b = 2)⇥TRADE 0.999
(0.096)
⇤ 1.089
(0.093)
⇤ 0.943
(0.140)
1.080
(0.106)
0.695
(0.313)
(b = 1)⇥Token -  0.610⇤
(0.062)
-  1.111
(0.004)
⇤⇤⇤  1.131
(0.007)
⇤⇤⇤
(b = 2)⇥Token -  0.169
(0.723)
-  0.206
(0.676)
 0.201
(0.681)
(b = 1)⇥TRADE⇥p¨ 2 (600, 950  50(b)] - - 1.399⇤⇤
(0.012)
2.016
(0.002)
⇤⇤⇤ 2.015
(0.002)
⇤⇤⇤
(b = 2)⇥TRADE⇥p¨ 2 (600, 950  50(b)] - - 0.162
(0.860)
0.018
(0.984)
0.029
(0.976)
Sequence - - - - 0.252
(0.570)
Familiarity - - - -  0.622
(0.314)
Gender - - - - 0.676
(0.147)
CRT Score - - - - 0.054
(0.09)
⇤
Business School - - - - 1.029
(0.285)
Eng, Math & Phy Science - - - - 1.852
(0.128)
Humanities - - - - 0.841
(0.431)
Life & Environmental Science - - - - 1.111
(0.343)
Social Science & Int’l Studies - - - - 0.922
(0.375)
Constant 1.194
(0.000)
⇤⇤⇤ 1.798
(0.000)
⇤⇤⇤ 1.201
(0.000)
⇤⇤⇤ 2.303
(0.000)
⇤⇤⇤ 1.054
(0.293)
 (2) 3.68⇤⇤⇤ 3.54⇤⇤⇤ 3.82⇤⇤⇤ 3.64⇤⇤⇤ 3.26⇤⇤⇤
 (3) 1.71011
2.8
1010
2.4
1011
4.8
1011
1.2
1012
Negative Log-Likelihood 395.01 393.12 391.62 387.51 384.20
⇤⇤⇤:p-value< 0.01; ⇤⇤:p-value< 0.05 and ⇤:p-value< 0.10
Level-1 Observations n = 827; Level-2 Observations n = 105 and Level-3 Observations n = 16.
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token ownership for subjects in TRADE at instances where b = 1. At instances where b = 2, no
significant e↵ect was observed.
Result 4: Consistent with H4, the likelihood of adherence to the optimal choices was found to
higher for those whose p¨ 2 (600, 950   50(b)] relative to those who were inactive or whose p¨ /2
(600, 950  50(b)], at instances where subjects in TRADE observed b = 1. At instance where b = 2,
no such relationships were found to be significant.
The regressions did not find any significant e↵ects due to di↵erences in gender, sequence ad-
ministered, schools or prior familiarity. The latter point is interesting since the decisional task for
subjects in the game stage might be trivial if they had prior familiarity with the problem. However,
this finding highlights a central feature of the Red Hat Puzzle, such that prior familiarity might
only helpful if it was common knowledge. There is some mild evidence that the likelihood of adher-
ence is increasing with the subjects’ scores in the Cognitive Reflective Test (CRT). The CRT test
involved three questions which required subjects to employ some e↵ort in thought and reasoning
before providing the answers. Given that the adherence to the optimal choices in the game stage
also requires logical reasoning, perhaps the CRT test score is capturing some of these abilities. De-
spite the subject characteristics controls, there still seem to be significant between-subject variances
( (2)) although the between group variances ( (3)) were not found to be significant.
Once again the results raises the question as to why any di↵erences between the BASE and
TRADE treatments or within the TRADE treatment, were only found to be significant at instances
where b = 1. Our prior on this matter is that the decisional task where b = 2 was too complicated or
complex for most subjects to comprehend. This is evidential in the above regressions, where the log-
likelihood of adherence was found to decrease by at least 4.831 (p-value=0.0001) in all treatments
when an average subject observes b = 2 relative to observing b = 1. By this extension, subjects
may have perceived the optimal choices at instances where b = 1 to be similar to those where b = 2.
If such misperception were indeed reflected in the purchase prices of tokens in TRADE, one should
expect the average purchase prices at instances where b = 1 to not be significantly di↵erent from
those where b = 2. We hence conducted a linear regression on the average purchase price (p¨) with
the situation dummies b0 and b2 which refer to these instances where subjects observed b = 0 and
b = 2, with b = 1 as the reference. The p-values are again reported in parenthesis.
p¨ = 80.76
(0.001)
b0   21.38
(0.276)
b2; N = 121, R
2 = 0.10 (4)
The regression result found p¨ to be significantly higher at instances where b = 0 relative to instances
where b = 1. However, at instances where b = 2, p¨ was not found to be significantly di↵erent from
those at b = 1. This lends some weight to the possibility that subjects may have misperceived the
optimal choices at instances where b = 2 to be similar to those where b = 1.
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VI. Conclusions
This paper was motivated by the question as to whether markets, as suggested by the con-
ventional wisdom, were able to allocate the rights for performing decisional tasks to those players
who are best suited to perform the tasks. To do so we embedded the decisional tasks in a game
motivated by Littlewood (1953) Red Hat Puzzle, and introduced markets where players were able
to trade their participation rights (in the form of tokens) to the game. Three treatments were
considered and we provided an economic intuition, consistent with the conventional wisdom, that
aggregated performances in TRADE should be higher than those in BASE1 and BASE2.
Aggregated performances in TRADE were found to be significantly lower than BASE1 and
BASE2. We show that this was primarily driven by instances in TRADE where subjects had
observed b = 1 black hat. To seek some explanations to this result, we studied the mean prices
in the markets of the pre-game stage in TRADE. Here, price bubbles were often observed in
markets where subjects observed b = 0, 1, 2 black hats. We conjectured that price bubbles could
have important consequences on the allocative outcomes of markets, as they might result in the
tokens being purchased by subjects who might otherwise have not known the optimal choices. Our
econometric regression provided some support for this conjecture at instance where subjects in
TRADE observed b = 1.
The results also shed some light on Kluger and Wyatts (2004) experiment findings with the
Monty Hall problem, that when there are at least two Sophisticated subjects in the market, prices
will converge to the equilibrium price. Clearly this is not the case in this paper, even when the
data suggest there to be more than two Sophisticated subjects. Their results might have been due
to the nature of the Monty Hall problem, where the “instinctive” price (Unsophisticated price) is
naturally lower than the equilibrium price. When the instinctive price is less obvious, such as in
this paper, their results may no longer hold.
The question therefore is why might subjects in TRADE be willing to purchase tokens at
prices p > 950   50b, especially at instances where b = 1. A possible explanation is simply that
such subjects may not be aware of their own limitations and hence mis-priced the tokens. This
phenomenon is sometimes known in the behaviour finance literature as the “overconfidence e↵ect”
(Odean, 1998; Shleifer, 2000).
To some extend, the results might also shed some light to the empirical literature in corpo-
rate governance. In an extensive survey of the corporate takeover literature by Martynova and
Renneboog (2008), the authors found little evidence that operating performances of the acquired
firms had improved ex-post takeovers. Surveys on behavioural finance also suggest that bidding
firms often overpay in corporate takeovers, a phenomenon usually known as the “Winner’s Curse”
(Kagel and Levin, 1986; Thaler, 1988; Barberis and Thaler, 2003). This paper capture some of the
discussions with respect to the Winner’s Curse as most subjects in TRADE who had purchased
additional tokens, had done so at elevated prices and were found to have performed worse in the
decisional task.
To conclude, this paper provides evidence that introducing a market where rights for performing
25
tasks can be traded, do not naturally lead to the allocation of such rights to those players who
might be best suited to perform the task. This is contradictory to the conventional wisdom and
has important implications for any economic designer considering the best mechanism to allocate
decisional tasks. Again it is important to emphasis that the task in this paper pertains to those
requiring players to employ logical and epistemological reasoning. The conventional wisdom may
hold in other circumstances, when the performances in the decisional tasks depend on other factors
such as e↵ort, information, knowledge or expertise. Nevertheless, we see potential for such a market
design in other more straightforward games, e.g., Guessing Game (Nagel, 1995) , Centipede Game.
This will be an ambition for further research.
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Appendix A. Instructions BASE1
There will be 10 experiment rounds, where you receive a payo↵ (denoted in ECU) at the end of each round. Upon
completion of all 10 rounds, your earnings for the experiment will be computed as the average over ten rounds and
converted to cash at the exchange rate of 67 ECU to £1. In addition, you will also receive a £5 show up fee. We
shall now describe each experimental round.
Each round will involve three coloured hats - A, B and C. Each hat can be either Red or Black, and there is
exactly one player under each hat.
1. You will not be able to see your own hat colour.
2. You will see on your computer screens the other two hat colours.
3. There will always be one black hat.
To determine the hat colours, the computer randomly picks from 1 of the 7 possible outcomes (see Table A1). For
example, in outcome 2, Hat A is red, Hat B is black and Hat C is black. The player under Hat A will see that: Hat
B is Black and Hat C is Black. The player under Hat B will see that: Hat A is Red and Hat C is Black. Finally, the
player under Hat C will see that: Hat A is Red and Hat B is Black. There is an equal chance for any one of these
outcomes. Notice that at each outcome, there will always be at least one black hat. See Figure A1 for an example of
what you might observe. Here you are under Hat A and you see that both Hat B and C are black.
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Your task in each round is to determine the colour of your hat. You will do this in the decision stage that will
consist of 4 period. At each period the computer will present you with the following question, to which you must
choose from 4 possible actions (a), (b), (c) or (d).
Computer’s question: “Do You Know your hat colour?”
Your actions (a) My Hat is RED, (b) My Hat is BLACK, (c) No! I will decide in a later period and (d)Toss a Coin,
I would never know.
Here are some rules:
RULE 1: At each period, you have a maximum of 4 minutes to choose an action
RULE 2: You will immediately end the decision stage if the actions (a), (b) or (d) were chosen
RULE 3: You will only go to the next period if you had chosen (c) in the previous period
RULE 4: If you arrive at period 4, you can only chose from the actions (a), (b) or (d)
RULE 5: If you had chosen (d) the computer will simulate a coin toss and choose on your BEHALF either option
(a) or (b) with equal chances
RULE 6: Any action chosen will be known to all other players in the subsequent period. Note: If you had chosen
(d) and the computer chooses (b) on your behalf, the other players will only see that you had chosen (b).
You are said to have “determined you hat colour” when you choose (a), (b) or (d). This is why you will only go to
the next period if you have chosen (c). For example, if you had chosen (a) in period 1, the decision stage immediately
ends for you. In period 2, all other players will observe that you had chosen (a) in period 1. However, if you had
chosen (c) in period 1, you go on to period 2, when you must again choose your action. All players will also observe
that you had chosen (c) in period 1. Here, are some screenshots to help you understand the decision stage design
(Figure A2 and Figure A3).
Figure A2 presents an illustration of the first period in the decision stage. You are under Hat B and you see
the other hat colours. In addition the computer presents you with the question “Do you know you hat colour” to
which you must reply with one of the 4 possible actions.
Figure A3 presents an illustration of the second period in the decision stage. You are under Hat B and you see
the other hat colours. The computer again presents you with the question “Do you know you hat colour” to which
you must reply with one of the 4 possible actions. In addition, you also see on your screen the actions chosen by the
other players in the previous period (period 1). You see that the player under Hat A had chosen (b) in period 1. You
also see that the player under Hat C had chosen (b) in period 1. Finally, in this illustration you had chosen (c) in
period 1.
After all players had ended the decision stage, your hat colour with be made known and your payo↵s for the
round will be determined. Your Payo↵s depends on whether you had correctly determined you hat colour and the
period which you had “determined your hat colour”. If you had chosen (a) or (b), then your payo↵s will depend on
whether you are correct and the period which you had chosen them (see Table A2). If You had chosen (d), then your
payo↵s will only depend on the period which you had chosen (d) (see Table A3).
The payo↵s can be easily summarised as followed. You start the round with 950 ECU. You get 50 ECU deducted
for each time you had chosen (c). In addition, you get 700 ECU deducted if you had chosen (a) or (b) and was found
to be incorrect, or no deduction if found to be correct. If you had chosen (d), you’ll get a fixed deduction of 250
ECU. Here are some examples to help you understand the payo↵
1. You hat is black. In period 1 you choose (c), in period 2 you choose (c) and in period 3 you choose (b). You
have correctly determined your hat colour and your payo↵s are therefore 850 ECU.
2. You hat is black. In period 1 you choose (c), in period 2 you choose (c) and in period 3 you choose (a). You
have incorrectly determined your hat colour and your payo↵s are therefore 150 ECU.
3. You hat is black. In period 1 you choose (c), in period 2 you (c) and in period 3 you choose (d). Your payo↵s
are therefore 600 ECU.
This completes the description of each experimental round. After the completion of 10 experiment rounds, we require
you to complete a survey before you receive your cash payments. Please feel free to clarify any question or doubts
you might have with regards to the instructions.
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Table A1. BASE1: The 7 Possible Outcomes
Outcomes (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Chance 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7
Hat A B R B B B R R
Hat B B B R B R B R
Hat C B B B R R R B
B=BLACK and R=RED
Figure A1. Screen Shot (BASE1) - You see all other Hat colours
Figure A2. Screen Shot (BASE1) - Decision Stage Period 1
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Figure A3. Screen Shot (BASE1) - Decision Stage Period 2
Table A2. BASE1: Payo↵s with Choosing (a) or (b)
Correct Incorrect
“determined you hat colour” in Period 1 950 ECU 250 ECU
“determined you hat colour” in Period 2 900 ECU 200 ECU
“determined you hat colour” in Period 3 850 ECU 150 ECU
“determined you hat colour” in Period 4 800 ECU 100 ECU
Table A3. BASE1: Payo↵s with Choosing (d)
“determined you hat colour” with (d) in Period 1 700ECU
“determined you hat colour” with (d) in Period 2 650ECU
“determined you hat colour” with (d) in Period 3 600ECU
“determined you hat colour” with (d) in Period 4 550ECU
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Appendix B. Instructions BASE2
There will be 10 experiment rounds, where you receive a payo↵ (denoted in ECU) at the end of each round. Upon
completion of all 10 rounds, your earnings for the experiment will be computed as the average over ten rounds and
converted to cash at the exchange rate of 67 ECU to £1. In addition, you will also receive a £5 show up fee. We
shall now describe each experimental round.
Each round will involve three coloured hats - A, B and C. Each hat can be either Red or Black, and there is
exactly six players under each hat.
1. You will not be able to see your own hat colour.
2. You will see on your computer screens the other two hat colours.
3. There will always be one black hat.
To determine the hat colours, the computer randomly picks from 1 of the 7 possible outcomes (see Table B1). or
example, in outcome 2, Hat A is red, Hat B is black and Hat C is black. The players under Hat A will see that: Hat
B is Black and Hat C is Black. The players under Hat B will see that: Hat A is Red and Hat C is Black. Finally, the
players under Hat C will see that: Hat A is Red and Hat B is Black. There is an equal chance for any one of these
outcomes. Notice that at each outcome, there will always be at least one black hat. See Figure B1 for an example of
what you might observe. Here you are under Hat A and you see that both Hat B and C are black.
Your task in each round is to determine the colour of your hat. You will do this in the decision stage that will
consist of 4 period. At each period the computer will present you with the following question, to which you must
choose from 4 possible actions (a), (b), (c) or (d).
Computer’s question: “Do You Know your hat colour?”
Your actions (a) My Hat is RED, (b) My Hat is BLACK, (c) No! I will decide in a later period and (d)Toss a Coin,
I would never know.
Here are some rules:
RULE 1: At each period, you have a maximum of 4 minutes to choose an action
RULE 2: You will immediately end the decision stage if the actions (a), (b) or (d) were chosen
RULE 3: You will only go to the next period if you had chosen (c) in the previous period
RULE 4: If you arrive at period 4, you can only chose from the actions (a), (b) or (d)
RULE 5: If you had chosen (d) the computer will simulate a coin toss and choose on your BEHALF either option
(a) or (b) with equal chances
RULE 6: Any action chosen will be known to all other players in the subsequent period. Note: If you had chosen
(d) and the computer chooses (b) on your behalf, the other players will only see that you had chosen (b).
You are said to have “determined you hat colour” when you choose (a), (b) or (d). This is why you will only go to
the next period if you have chosen (c). For example, if you had chosen (a) in period 1, the decision stage immediately
ends for you. In period 2, all other players will observe that you had chosen (a) in period 1. However, if you had
chosen (c) in period 1, you go on to period 2, when you must again choose your action. All players will also observe
that you had chosen (c) in period 1. Here, are some screenshots to help you understand the decision stage design
(Figure B2, Figure B3 and Figure B4).
Figure B2 presents an illustration of the first period in the decision stage. You are under Hat B and you see
the other hat colours. In addition the computer presents you with the question “Do you know you hat colour” to
which you must reply with one of the 4 possible actions.
Figure B3 resents an illustration of the second period in the decision stage. You are under Hat A and you see
the other hat colours. The computer again presents you with the question “Do you know you hat colour” to which
you must reply with one of the 4 possible actions. In addition, you also see on your screen the actions chosen by the
other players in the previous period. For the six players under Hat A, all of them had chosen (c) in period 1. For the
six players under Hat B, one of them had chosen (a), one of them had chosen (b) and four of them had chosen (c) in
period 1. Finally for the six players under Hat C, two of them had chosen (a), one of them had chosen (b) and three
of them had chosen (c) in period 1.
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Table B1. BASE2: The 7 Possible Outcomes
Outcomes (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Chance 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7
Hat A B R B B B R R
Hat B B B R B R B R
Hat C B B B R R R B
B=BLACK and R=RED
Table B2. BASE2: Payo↵s with Choosing (a) or (b)
Correct Incorrect
“determined your hat colour” in Period 1 950 ECU 250 ECU
“determined your hat colour” in Period 2 900 ECU 200 ECU
“determined your hat colour” in Period 3 850 ECU 150 ECU
“determined your hat colour” in Period 4 800 ECU 100 ECU
Figure B4 presents an illustration of the third period in the decision stage. You are under Hat A and you see
the other hat colours. The computer again presents you with the question “Do you know you hat colour” to which
you must reply with one of the 4 possible actions. For the six players under Hat A, all of them had chosen (c) in
period 2. For the six players under Hat B, two of them had chosen (b) in period 2, two of them had chosen (c)
in period 2 and two of them had not participated in period 2 since they had ended the round in period 1 and are
awaiting results. For the six players under Hat C, three of them had chosen (c) in period 2 and three of them had
not participated in period 2 as they had ended the round in an earlier period.
After all players had ended the decision stage, your hat colour with be made known and your payo↵s for the
round will be determined. Your Payo↵s depends on whether you had correctly determined you hat colour and the
period which you had “determined your hat colour”. If you had chosen (a) or (b), then your payo↵s will depend on
whether you are correct and the period which you had chosen them (see Table B2). If You had chosen (d), then your
payo↵s will only depend on the period which you had chosen (d) (see Table B3). Here are some examples to help
you understand the payo↵s:
The payo↵s can be easily summarised as followed. You start the round with 950 ECU. You get 50 ECU deducted
for each time you had chosen (c). In addition, you get 700 ECU deducted if you had chosen (a) or (b) and was found
to be incorrect, or no deduction if found to be correct. If you had chosen (d), you’ll get a fixed deduction of 250
ECU. Here are some examples to help you understand the payo↵
1. You hat is black. In period 1 you choose (c), in period 2 you choose (c) and in period 3 you choose (b). You
have correctly determined your hat colour and your payo↵s are therefore 850 ECU.
2. You hat is black. In period 1 you choose (c), in period 2 you choose (c) and in period 3 you choose (a). You
have incorrectly determined your hat colour and your payo↵s are therefore 150 ECU.
3. You hat is black. In period 1 you choose (c), in period 2 you (c) and in period 3 you choose (d). Your payo↵s
are therefore 600 ECU.
This completes the description of each experimental round. After the completion of 10 experiment rounds, we require
you to complete a survey before you receive your cash payments. Please feel free to clarify any question or doubts
you might have with regards to the instructions.
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Figure B1. Screen Shot (BASE2) - You see all other Hat colours
Figure B2. Screen Shot (BASE2) - Decision Stage Period 1
Table B3. BASE2: Payo↵s with Choosing (d)
“determined your hat colour” with (d) in Period 1 700ECU
“determined your hat colour” with (d) in Period 2 650ECU
“determined your hat colour” with (d) in Period 3 600ECU
“determined your hat colour” with (d) in Period 4 550ECU
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Figure B3. Screen Shot (BASE2) - Decision Stage Period 2
Figure B4. Screen Shot (BASE2) - Decision Stage Period 3
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Appendix C. Instructions TRADE
There will be 10 experiment rounds, where you receive a payo↵ (denoted in ECU) at the end of each round. Upon
completion of all 10 rounds, your earnings for the experiment will be computed as the average over ten rounds and
converted to cash at the exchange rate of 100 ECU to £1. In addition, you will also receive a £8 show up fee. We
shall now describe each experimental round.
Each round will involve three coloured hats - A, B and C. Each hat can be either Red or Black, and there is
exactly six players under each hat.
1. You will not be able to see your own hat colour.
2. You will see on your computer screens the other two hat colours.
3. There will always be one black hat.
To determine the hat colours, the computer randomly picks from 1 of the 7 possible outcomes (see Table C1). or
example, in outcome 2, Hat A is red, Hat B is black and Hat C is black. The players under Hat A will see that: Hat
B is Black and Hat C is Black. The players under Hat B will see that: Hat A is Red and Hat C is Black. Finally, the
players under Hat C will see that: Hat A is Red and Hat B is Black. There is an equal chance for any one of these
outcomes. Notice that at each outcome, there will always be at least one black hat. See Figure C1 for an example of
what you might observe. Here you are under Hat A and you see that both Hat B and C are black.
Overview of the Round
After you have observed the hat colours, the round will continued to the “trading stage” followed by the “decision
stage”. You begin the trading stage with 1 Token and a loan of 6000 ECU cash that must be returned at the end of
the round. In the trading stage you have the opportunity to either buy more tokens or sell your token. You will only
be trading with the other players under the same hat. After all transaction of tokens are completed, only players
with at least one token will proceed to the decision stage - if you do not wish to participate in the decision stage,
you should sell your token. In the decision stage, you will perform the task of determining your hat colour. After
you have completed the decision stage, you will return the loan of 6000 ECU, and your tokens owned will redeemed
by the computer (bought by the computer) at a rate that will depend on your behaviours in the decision stage. In
the following, we shall first describe the design of the trading and decision stages. Thereafter, we will describe how
you token redemption rate will be determined and finally we will describe your payo↵s in the round.
Trading Stage
All players begin the trading stage with One Token and a loan 6000 ECU (Money) that must be paid back at
the end of the round. Here you are permitted to buy or sell tokens, but only with the other players under the same
hat. This implies that the market will consist of exactly 6 players and will last for 120 seconds. You will buy and sell
tokens through a continuous double auction mechanism which we will now explain. See figure C2 for a screenshot of
the trading stage.
The buy or sell tokens, you will need to first announce your “Ask” and “Bid” prices to all other players. Your Ask
price (between 0 and 1200ECU) tells all other players how much you are willing to sell a token for. Your Bid price
(between 0 and 1200ECU) tells all other players how much you are willing to buy a token for. The column “Market
Ask Prices” reflects the ask prices of all six players you interact with. The column “Market Bid Prices” reflects the
bid prices of all six players you interact with. To buy a token, simply select the price on the “Market Ask Prices”
column and click “Buy”. Likewise to sell tokens simply select the price on the “Market Bid Prices” column and click
“sell”. The column “Market Price” provides the history of all transaction prices for tokens. After 120 seconds, the
trading stage will end and you will see on your screens the amount of money you have and the number of tokens you
own. See figure C3 for a screenshot.
Decision Stage
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Only players with at least one token can participate in the Decision Stage. If you do not have any tokens, you
can observe the decision of all other players participating in the Decision Stage through your computer screens but
may not yourself participate. You task in the decision stage is to determine the colour of your hat. The decision
stage will consist of 4 periods. At each period the computer will present you with the following question, to which
you must choose from 3 possible actions (a), (b) or (c).
Computer’s question: “Do You Know your hat colour?”
Your actions (a) My Hat is RED, (b) My Hat is BLACK and (c) No! I will decide in a later period. Here are some
rules:
RULE 1: At each period, you have a maximum of 4 minutes to choose an action
RULE 2: You will immediately end the decision stage if the actions (a) or (b) were chosen
RULE 3: You will only go to the next period if you had chosen (c) in the previous period
RULE 4: If you arrive at period 4, you can only chose from the actions (a) or (b)
RULE 5: Any action chosen will be known to all other players in the subsequent period.
Here, are some screenshots to help you understand the decision stage design (Figure C4, C5 and C6).
You are said to have “determined your hat colour” when you choose (a) or (b). This is why you will only go to
the next period if you have chosen (c). To help you understand the experiment design we have include some screen
shoots in Figures C4, C5 and C6.
Figure C4 presents an illustration of the first period in the decision stage. You are under Hat A and you see
the other hat colours. In addition the computer presents you with the question “Do you know you hat colour” to
which you must reply with one of the 3 possible actions.
Figure C5 presents an illustration of the second period in the decision stage. You are under Hat A and you see
the other hat colours. The computer again presents you with the question “Do you know you hat colour” to which
you must reply with one of the 3 possible actions. In addition, you also see on your screen the actions chosen by
the other players in the previous period. Here there are only two players under hat A who had participated in the
decision stage. One player has 4 tokens and the other player has 2 tokens. You see that the player with 4 tokens had
chosen (c) in period 1 and the player with 2 tokens had chosen (c) in period 1. Under hat B, there are three players
who had participated in the decisions stage. All three player have 2 tokens and had chosen (c) in period 1. Finally,
under Hat C, there are 4 players who had participate in the decision stage, one of them has 3 tokens, whilst the other
three have only one token. You see that the 3 token player had chosen (c) in period 1. Two of the players with one
token had chosen (c) in period 1 whilst the last player, also with one token, had chosen (b) in period 1.
Figure C6 presents an illustration of the third period in the decision stage. You are under Hat A and you see
the other hat colours. The computer again presents you with the question “Do you know you hat colour” to which
you must reply with one of the 3 possible actions. There are two player under hat A. The two token player had chosen
(c) in period 2. The four token player had chosen (b) in period 2. There are 3 players under hat B, each of them
with two tokens. One of them had chosen (b) in period 2, whilst the other two had chosen (c) in period 2. There are
four players under hat C. The three token player had chosen (c) in period 2. Amongst the one token players, one of
them did not participate in period 2 as he had chosen either (a) or (b) in the period 1. Thus that player is said to
have ended the game. However, the other two players with one tokens had chosen (b) in period 2.
Token Redemption Rate
After all players have completed the decision stage, your tokens will be redeemed by the computer. The redemp-
tion rate will depend on the period which you had “determined your hat colour” and whether you were correct. The
payo↵s can be easily summarised as followed. Each token is initially worth 950 ECU. The token’s value decreases by
50 ECU for each time you had chosen (c). In addition, the tokens value decreases by 700 ECU if you had chosen (a)
or (b) and was found to be incorrect, or 0 ECU if found to be correct. See Table C2 for an overview of the redemption
rate. Here are some examples to help you understand the redemption rate:
1. You hat is black. In period 1 you choose (c), in period 2 you choose (c) and in period 3 you choose (b). You
have correctly determined your hat colour and your token redemption rate is therefore 850 ECU.
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Table C1. TRADE: The 7 Possible Outcomes
Outcomes (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Chance 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7
Hat A B R B B B R R
Hat B B B R B R B R
Hat C B B B R R R B
B=BLACK and R=RED
Table C2. TRADE: Token Redemption Rate
Correct Incorrect
“determined your hat colour” in Period 1 950 ECU 250 ECU
“determined your hat colour” in Period 2 900 ECU 200 ECU
“determined your hat colour” in Period 3 850 ECU 150 ECU
“determined your hat colour” in Period 4 800 ECU 100 ECU
2. You hat is black. In period 1 you choose (c), in period 2 you choose (c) and in period 3 you choose (a). You
have incorrectly determined your hat colour and your token redemption rate is 150 ECU.
End of Round Payo↵
Your payo↵s at the end of each round will be determined as followed:
Payo↵s = (Money After Trading Stage - 6000) + (Tokens) x (Redemption Rate)
If your payo↵s will found to be negative, we will round it o↵ to 0 ECU. This completes the description of each
experimental round. After the completion of 10 experiment rounds, we require you to complete a survey before you
receive your cash payments. Please feel free to clarify any question or doubts you might have with regards to the
instructions.
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Figure C1. Screen Shot (TRADE) - You see all other Hat colours
Figure C2. Screen Shot (TRADE) - Trading Stage
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Figure C3. Screen Shot (TRADE) - Trading Stage Results
Figure C4. Screen Shot (TRADE) - Decision Stage Period 1
40
Figure C5. Screen Shot (TRADE) - Decision Stage Period 2
Figure C6. Screen Shot (TRADE) - Decision Stage Period 3
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